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ABSTRACT

Four hundred and seventy residents of Ridgewood, New Jersey, and 493 residents of Jyvaskyla, Finland, were randomly selected and interviewed about their attitudes concerning nuclear war. In each area, a high proportion of the sample believed that some kind of nuclear incident is likely in the next decade. The vast majority stated that a nuclear war could not be won and that they expected to die in the event of war. About three-quarters in both communities seldom discuss nuclear issues with anyone, including their own children, and only one-quarter of the United States sample and about half of the Finnish sample have ever done anything personally to oppose the arms race. About half of the Americans and three-quarters of the Finns said that the United States was not doing everything possible to prevent nuclear war, and many in both groups favored disarmament. Males in both groups were more likely to believe that nuclear war is winable and survivable. "Survivalists" and "activists" differed on many key questions. Other issues are discussed, particularly with reference to numerous recent studies concerning nuclear attitudes. Also discussed is the issue of advocacy research and the role of the behavioral sciences in dealing with the nuclear threat. (Author)

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Attitudes concerning nuclear war in Finland and the United States

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Abstract

470 residents of Ridgewood, New Jersey, and 493 residents of Jyväskylä, Finland were randomly selected and interviewed about their attitudes concerning nuclear war. In both areas, a high proportion of the samples believed that some kind of nuclear incident is likely in the next decade. The vast majority stated that a nuclear war could not be won and that they expected to die in the event of war. About three-quarters in both communities seldom discuss nuclear issues with anyone including their own children, and only one-quarter of the U.S sample and about half of the Finnish sample have ever done anything personally to oppose the arms race. About half of the Americans and three-quarters of the Finns said that the U.S. was not doing everything possible to prevent nuclear war, and many in both groups favored disarmament. Males in both groups were more likely to believe that nuclear war is winable and survivable. "Survivalists" and "activists" differed on many key questions. Other issues are discussed, particularly with reference to numerous recent studies concerning nuclear attitudes. Also discussed is the issue of advocacy research and the role of the behavioral sciences in dealing with the nuclear threat.

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Attitudes concerning nuclear war in Finland and the United States

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INTRODUCTION. Perhaps the most troublesome issue facing the world today is the threat of nuclear war. Despite its overwhelming importance, research on this problem has proved elusive, and it is only in the last few years that the nuclear threat has begun to receive considerable attention from behavioral scientists (see the entire reference section). The problem of war and peace is unusually difficult because it involves complex global issues that combine political, economic, social, behavioral, and military questions. For the pure scientist, it presents special difficulties because the research may be objective, but the objectives of the research are often advocacy and education. Behavioral scientists interested in advocacy research have an additional problem: their best research efforts traditionally have little impact on public policy.

In spite of the recent surge of interest in nuclear questions, the concern is not new. In fact, an introduction to a study done almost 40 years ago can serve as an introduction to the present investigation:

> Over two years have elapsed since Hiroshima. How do Americans feel about the problem which that one event brought to them with such dramatic clarity? Are they actively concerned about the bomb, or do they look upon it as a guarantee of our own security in a troubled world? Or are they inclined to disregard it and leave the solution of the problems brought by the "atomic age" in the hands of the specialists who helped usher it in? (Woodward, 1948)

Like the 1948 study reported by Woodward, the present investigation utilizes the survey research technique. Survey research is usually employed by sociologists and political scientists rather than psychologists, but there is evidence that this is beginning to change (Loftus, Fienberg, and Tanur, 1985). Many nuclear threat surveys have been done with children or college students, but recently there has been more interest in the general adult population as well (Johnson, 1984; Klineberg, 1984; Kramer, Kalick, and Millburn, 1983; Pulkkinen, Oranen, and Poijula, 1984; Schofield and Pavelchak, 1984; Zweigenhaft, 1984). Extensive polling is also done regularly by large national survey organizations, and in general these polls are useful because they employ large (about 1,500) random samples. These polls tend to be atheoretical in nature and meant for public consumption, and they usually focus on current news with a few nuclear items thrown in.

In accordance with suggestions made by Klineberg (1984), the present study was intended to be interdisciplinary in approach and international in scope. It was decided to measure public attitudes about arms control and nuclear war in a neutral country (Finland) and a pro-Western country (the United States). It was also decided to study particular well-defined communities rather than aim for a hypothetical "average citizen" or national stereotype. Finally, it was decided to ask not only political questions, but also more personal questions about how people deal with the nuclear threat on an individual level.

METHODS

The Communities. The communities studied were Ridgewood, New Jersey and Jyväskylä, Finland. Although these communities differ in some ways (e.g., size), they also have important similarities (both are above their national average in terms of education). Residents of both towns can be considered articulate and well-informed (but not necessarily representative of their entire country).

Ridgewood is a suburban community of 25,208 people located about 15 miles from Manhattan. It is populated primarily with highly affluent, sophisticated, well-educated professionals. It is distinguished by its excellent schools and public services, and was listed recently as one of the fifteen safest communities in the country. In September of 1983, President Reagan cited Ridgewood for its excellent reputation as a good place to live and raise a family.

Jyväskylä is a medium-sized city in Central Finland with a population of 60,000. It is a busy university town and industrial center where the level of education is slightly above the average for Finland.

The Sample. In Ridgewood, 470 residents were interviewed by telephone while in Jyväskylä the sample was 493. Those selected for interviews were randomly sampled from the telephone directory. In Ridgewood, the sample was 54% female and 46% male while in Jyväskylä the sample was 58% female and 42% male. In both cases, the sample approximates the sex ratio according to the census. The age distribution for respondents paralleled population characteristics in both communities. At the 95% level of confidence, the sample reliability for each community is approximately ± 4%. This means that in 95 times out of 100, the true results would be plus or minus 4 percentage points from the figures actually obtained.

Procedure. In both samples, polling was conducted primarily durings evenings and weekends. A 17 item questionnaire developed for Ridgewood was translated and slightly modified for the Finnish sample. Polling took place during December of 1983 and January of 1984 for the Ridgewood sample, shortly after the airing of the ABC-TV movie, The Day After. Polling was conducted during the spring of 1984 in Jyväskylä. In both cases, respondents were told that the polling was part of a research project at the college or university.

RESULTS

Discussion of nuclear issues. When asked how often they discuss nuclear issues with other people, only 22% of Finns and 25% of Ridgewood residents said they do so frequently. Just above half in both samples said they do so occasionally and about a quarter stated almost never. Respondents were then asked if they discuss nuclear issues with their own children. Thirteen percent of the Finns said "frequently," 61% said "on occasion," and 27% said "almost never." The respective figures for Ridgwood residents were 16%, 41%, and 43%. In summary, only about a quarter in both samples regularly discuss nuclear issues, and considerably fewer do so with their own children.

Survival. American and Finnish respondents provided remarkably similar answers when asked about the possibility of some kind of nuclear incident somewhere in the world during the next decade. Nineteen percent of the Finns and 20 percent of the Americans said a nuclear incident was almost certain and 45% of the Finns and 50% of the Americans stated that it was moderately certain. Thirty-four percent of Finns and 30% of Americans felt that it was highly improbable. Thus, about two-thirds of both groups believe that some kind of nuclear incident is certain or moderately certain.

Respondents were then asked if it is possible to win a nuclear war. Eight percent of the Finns and 7 percent of the Americans replied "yes." Eightly-five percent of the Finns and 78 percent of the Americans said "no."

If there were a major nuclear war, only 4% of the Finns and 6% of the Americans thought they would survive. Eighty-eight percent of the Finns and 78 percent of the Americans said they would probably die. The rest felt that they might survive. With regard to preparations for nuclear war, three percent of the Finns and six percent of the Americans said they have already begun making preparations. Among the Americans, this consisted of evaluating different methods of suicide (the most common response), or stockpiling supplies and planning evacuation routes. Ridgewood residents were also asked if they would share food and shelter in the event that they survived. Thirty-eight percent said they would share with anyone, an equal 38% said that they would share only with friends or family, but 24% stated that they would keep anyone away except for their own family.

Perceptions about the Military. Both samples were asked to compare overall U.S. and Soviet military strength. Almost twice as many Finns compared to Americans though that the U.S. was clearly superior (33% vs. 17%). More Americans thought the Soviets were ahead (27% compared to 21%). Fifty-six percent of Americans and 25% of Finns thought both sides were about equal (21% of the Finns said they didn't know). On military spending, almost half (48%) of Ridgewood respondents felt that their government was spending too much. Sixteen percent said "not enough" and 36% answered that military spending was "just right." Among Finns, half said that their own military spending was about right. Fifteen percent felt that there was too much military spending, 17 percent thought it was not enough, and another seventeen percent said they didn't know.

The Ridgewood sample was also asked how the U.S. buildup of nuclear weapons affected their own feelings of security. There was almost an even split: 35% said it increased security, 33% felt it decreased security, and 32% stated that it had no effect.

As a test of knowledge about nuclear hardware, both samples were asked if they could explain the difference between a kiloton warhead and a megaton warhead. Sixty-seven percent of the Finnish sample and 58 percent of the U.S. sample could not. (The typical 15 megaton warhead on today's ICBMs is a thousand times more powerful than the 15 kiloton bomb which destroyed Hiroshima.)

The Finnish sample was asked an additional question about the introduction of new American and Soviet nuclear missiles in Europe. Ninety-one percent opposed American missiles and 92% opposed Soviet missiles. Two percent were in favor of both and about 6% didn't know.

The Politics of Disarmament. Do politicians get more votes by advocating increased military spending? Almost half (48%) of Ridgewood residents stated that they would be less likely to vote for a Congressional candidate who advocated increased military spending. Eighteen percent said they would be more likely to support such a candidate and 3% said it would make no difference. A similar percentage of Finns (48%) also said they would be inclined to vote against a pro-military candidate for Parliament. Eight percent said that they would support a military spender, 39% said it would have no effect on their vote, and 6% were uncertain.

An idea widely discussed in Scandanavia is a proposal for a Nordic nuclear-free zone. Not surprisingly it received very strong Finnish endorsement (92% in favor and 5% opposed). In Ridgewood, half of the sample had never heard of this proposal. Of those that had, 33% were in favor and 10% were opposed.

When asked if their own government was doing everything possible to prevent nuclear war, a surprising 45% of Americans inverviewed said "no." Twenty-nine percent said "yes" and 26% didn't know. In Finland, this question was asked for all three governments. Sixty-four percent said that their own government was doing everything possible, but only 26% said the same for the Soviet government. The U.S. government scored even lower with 14%. Seventy-one percent of the Finns said that the U.S. was not doing everything possible but only 53% said the same thing of the Russian government. Twenty-five percent of the Finns believed that their own government was not doing everything possible to prevent nuclear war.

The American sample was asked several additional questions about disarmament. Respondents were asked what should be the goals of U.S. military policy, and only 19% stated that it should aim at being number one militarily. Twelve percent felt that the U.S. should be equal to the Soviets while 27% stated that the U.S. needs a strong deterrent but should not compete with the U.S.S.R. The biggest proportion (42%) replied that the main goal of the United States should be to search for ways to achieve disarmament.

With regard to the best way to approach disarmament, about half (48%) of the Ridgewood respondents stated that the U.S. should not begin disarmament unless the Russians do the same. A third said that the U.S. should take small steps now and hope the Soviets will follow. Nineteen percent went even further and took the position that the U.S. should take the lead with major steps regardless of what the Soviet Union does.

Personal involvement. All subjects were asked if they have ever done anything personally to oppose the arms race. About half of the Finns (46%) said "yes" while in Ridgewood only a quarter (24%) has ever done anything personally.

Sex differences. In both sample males tended to be more "hawkish." Fewer Ridgewood men advocated disarmament and more men compared to women felt that the U.S. should strive to be number one militarily. Men were more likely to feel that a nuclear buildup provided more security, and men were more likely to vote for pro-military candidates.

In the American sample, more than three times as many men compared to women believed that they could somehow survive a nuclear war. More males also felt that a nuclear war could be won (8% of males compared to 5% of females).

The Finnish males compared to females were also more likely the believe that a nuclear war could be won and that they might survive. They were also less critical of the introduction of nuclear missiles in Europe, less active in peace movements, offered less support for the concept of a Nordic nuclear-free zone. It is interesting to note that a recent study of Finnish teenagers (Wahlström, 1984) also reported more support for military armament among boys compared to girls.

Survivalists vs. activists. Survivalists were defined as those people who thought that they could survive a nuclear war. Survivalists in Ridgewood did not necessarily believe that nuclear war was more likely, but more than three times as many said it could be won (18% compared to 5% for the rest of the sample). While less than a third of the rest of the sample said that the nuclear buildup increased their security, over half of the survivalists believed this (31% vs. 53%). More survivalists said that there was too little military spending (23% compared to 15% for the others) and many fewer said there was too much military spending (29% compared to 52%). Survivalists were more likely to argue for being number one militarily (25% compared to 17%) and much less likely to support disarmament (19% compared to 46%). Survivalists discussed nuclear issues with their friends and family about the same as others interviewed, but were somewhat less likely to do anything to protest the arms race.

A similar picture emerged in Finland. Survivalists were more in favor of increased military spending and more likely to say that a nuclear war could be won. Like the Americans, fewer did anything to oppose the arms race.

Activists were defined as those who claimed to have done something personally to oppose the arms race. Activists in Ridgewood were much more likely to state that military spending was too high (88% agreed with this compared to only 37% for the remainder of the sample). Over twice as many felt that the nuclear buildup actually decreased their security (55% compared to 25% for the others). Many fewer advocated being number one militarily (8% compared to 22%) and many more supported disarmament (62% compared to 36%). Like the survivalists, the activists did not feel that nuclear war was any more certain, but unlike the survivalists, they were convinced that it could not be won (only 2% thought it could be won compared to 18% for the survivalists). In general, activists were much more likely to discuss nuclear issues with their friends, family, or children (55% compared to 25% for the others). Many fewer advocated being number one militarily (8% compared to 22%) and many more support twice as likely as the rest of the sample to understand the difference between kiloton warheads and megaton warheads.

Finnish activists were much less in favor of increased nuclear spending compared to non-activists (11% vs. 29%), and only half as many believed that a nuclear war could be won (5% vs. 10%). Like the Americans, they were much more likely to discuss nuclear issues with their family, friends, and children. Table 1 summarizes the results for the survivalists and activists for both countries.

DISCUSSION

One of the key questions for political psychology is whether attitude assessment is merely an academic exercise or whether it has any influence on public policy. Some skeptics (Kelman, 1965) have argued that public opinion is determined by foreign policy rather than the other way around. Western observers often assert that this is true in the Soviet Union where public opinion is manipulated to mold attitudes (Mickiewicz, 1981). In the United States, public opinion is often molded by media events (Schofield and Pavelchak, 1985) or by clever public relations campaigns carried out by the government or by private companies. But while citizens usually rally behind the policies of their government, there is no disputing the fact that public opinion can change government policy. Perhaps the best example is the public protests which led to the U.S. withdrawal from the Vietnam War. Today, opinion polling has become an integral part of politics in the United States. The results of polls are studied carefully by policy makers before they shape their public positions.

Some overall impressions emerge from the present research. Perhaps the most notable observation is the remarkable similarity of the two samples, one in the metropolitan New York area and the other 11,000 kilometers away in central Finland. A similar proportion of those in Ridgewood, New Jersey and Jyväskylä, Finland believe that a nuclear war cannot be won, yet some kind of nuclear incident is likely to occur. Most believe that they will die in a nuclear war, yet few have made any preparations and three-quarters discuss the issue only on occasion or never. About half of each sample said they would vote against pro-military political candidates, and a substantial proportion in both communities said that the United States was not doing everything possible to prevent nuclear war (45% in Ridgewood and 71% in Jyvaskyla).

There were also differences between the two samples. Perhaps the most interesting difference was the fact that about twice as many Finns (46% compared to 24% in New Jersey) claim that they have done something personally to oppose the arms race. It is also interesting to note that the Americans tend to see the Soviets as being stronger militarily while the Finns consider the Americans to be superior.

It is difficult to compare the Ridgewood results with other national surveys. At best, a poll may provide insights on opinions in a particular place at a given time. At worst, it may suggest inappropriate oversimplifications with unknown biases. Polls are known to be affected by the sampling techniques, wording of questions, the order of questions, the time of the interview, the demeanor of the interviewer, and many other factors. As a result, direct comparisons from one poll to another are hazardous. Polls can be especially risky when attempting to predict the outsome of a close election, however there is less danger when used to identify general attitudes (as in the present study).

There are some indications that the Ridgwood results are in line with other survey data. For example, the 17% who said that the U.S. is stronger militarily exactly matches the 17% figure for a CBS/New York Times national poll reported in January of 1985. Twenty-seven percent of the Ridgewood sample and 29% of the national sample said that the U.S.S.R. was stronger. Nationally, perceptions of a Soviet military advantage appear to be declining, but U.S. attitudes are still far different from those in Finland where it is widely believed that the U.S. is stronger.

Regarding the chances of surviving a nuclear war, the Ridgewood results were almost identical to those obtained in a national poll by the Public Agenda Foundation in 1984. Although worded slightly differently, 78% of the Ridgewood residents and 77% of the national sample expect to die. Only 6% of the Ridgewood sample and 4% of the national sample believe they can survive.

On the question of military spending, 48% of the Ridgewood residents and an identical 48% surveyed nationally in January of 1983 (CBS/N.Y. Times poll) said that military spending is too high. Another national survey taken earlier (summer of 1982) by the National Opinion Research Center at the Univ. of Chicago reported a somewhat lower figure (30%).

Perhaps the most startling difference emerges on estimates of war or nuclear catastrophe. In the 1982 NORC poll cited above, 69% agreed that there would be "a war" within ten years. In November of 1983, the CBS/N.Y. Times poll found that 40% of those surveyed nationally said that there would be a "nuclear war" within a decade. A little over a year later (January of 1985), the same poll reported that the figure had dropped to 29%. In 1984, the Public Agenda Foundation reported that 13% were certain of a nuclear war and 25% were moderately certain. In contrast, 20% of those in Ridgewood (19% in Finland) were certain and 50% moderately certain (45% in Finland) of some kind of "nuclear incident." It appears that Ridgewood residents are considerably more pessimistic than the recent national samples, however the wording "nuclear incident" rather than "nuclear war" may explain some of the difference.

With regard to the Finnish study, some comparisons can be made with another recent mail survey of 6,851 Finnish youths aged 12 to 19 (Solantaus, Rimpela, and Taipale, 1984). Twenty-eight percent of this group said that they thought about the threat of nuclear war about once a week and a third said they discussed it at home at least once a month. This is slightly more than the present study in which 25 percent said they discussed nuclear issues frequently.

In terms of concern about survival, the Solantaus, Rimpela, and Taipale (1984) study reported that fear of nuclear war was the main fear mentioned by about 64 percent of the Finnish children (this ranged from about half of the 18 year olds to almost 80 percent of the 12 year olds). In the present study of adults, an almost identical 65 percent said that a nuclear incident was certain or almost certain.

On the theoretical side, the Ridgewood results lend support to the findings of Fiske, Pratto, and Pavelchak (1983) who reported that people with more concrete images of nuclear war are more likely to be anti-nuclear. Ridgewood residents are better-informed and more highly educated than the national average, and they are also more fearful of war and more favorably disposed towards arms control. Indeed, within the Ridgewood sample it was found that those who knew more about nuclear weapons were more likely to have done something personally to oppose the arms race.

Feshbach, Kandel, and Haist (1984) provide further evidence of a relationship between knowledge about nuclear weapons and political opposition to them. In comparing a nuclear armament information test with a disarmament attitude scale, they found that the more informed people are about nuclear issues, the less likely they are to favor nuclear buildup. Another study of college students, however, reported that political powerlessness and nationalism were better predictors of nuclear attitudes than knowledge about the arms race or attitudes about the Soviets (Flamenbaum, et al, 1985).

Zweigenhaft (in press), found a positive correlation between knowledge about nuclear weapons and anti-nuclear attitudes among blacks and white females. But with white males, the more they knew about nuclear weapons the less they supported the concept of a nuclear freeze. Zweigenhaft suggested that this might be peculiar to the politically conservative southern white male. Additionally, he hypothesized that there may be a minimal threshold of knowledge about nuclear issues. Once it is reached, additional information may have little effect in changing attitudes.

Another theoretical model is provided by Tyler and McGraw (1983) who identified survival behavior and prevention behavior as two common (but not mutually exclusive) responses to the nuclear threat. They reported evidence that some people believe that nuclear war is survivable but not preventable while others believe that it is preventable but not survivable.

The present study did not directly examine whether people thought nuclear war was preventable, but it did fail to find a major difference between survivalists and activists as to whether they thought a nuclear incident might take place. What did emerge, however, is a profile of survivalists and activists which is not inconsistent with the Tyler and McGraw study. Survivalists are more likely to believe that one can survive and win a nuclear war. They believe that more nuclear weapons means more security, and they favor increased military spending. At the same time, they oppose disarmament as a national strategy and support military superiority. These individuals don't like to talk about the nuclear threat and are unlikely to do anything personally to prevent it.

Activists, on the other hand, believe that nuclear war cannot be won or survived. They feel that the arms race decreases their security and they oppose military spending. They favor disarmament rather than military superiority as a national goal. Activists clearly discuss nuclear issues more often with friends and family, although this is much more apparent in the Ridgewood sample than in the Jyväskylä sample (see Table 1). This finding confirms one of the major conclusions of Pavelchak and Shofield (1985) with regard to issue salience: the more often people talk about or think about nuclear war, the more likely they are to be active in its prevention.

Although these profiles are oversimplifications which require additional empirical testing, they may contribute to an understanding of the resistance to arms control. It would appear that an increased knowledge and understanding of nuclear weapons and their effects would provide both the concerte images necessary (Fiske, Pratto, and Pavelchak, 1983) as well as undermine the notion of winability and survivability.

The overall results of the present study are alarmingly similar to those reported by Woodward back in 1948. Some of her conclusions are worth quoting:

> People repeatedly referred to the terrifyingly destructive power of the bomb....One might expect such a belief to lead automatically to an active concern about the bomb....This does not seem to be the case. Even one year after the startling announcement of the bomb, public thinking about it could not be described as "active concern"....This general lack of active concern - indeed, near apathy toward the bomb - seems to stem primarily from a feeling of helplessness...for it seems extremely unlikely that many people will feel active concern about a problem before which they feel helpless. Such a situation would be too frustrating; therefore they tend to insulate themselves against it. (Woodward, 1948)

In 1948, the people in Woodward's study said they were not worried about the atomic bomb because (a)it was an American weapon and no one else had it; (b) people living outside major cities felt safe because the bomb would not affect them; (c) atomic war was unlikely to happen in their lifetime, so why worry; (d) the bomb is so horrible that of course it will eventually be outlawed. Today, we can laugh at such reasoning, but we cannot laugh at the apathy which somehow continues without any better reasons for lack of concern.

One might ask the question of why science should get involved at all with such public policy questions. Are politics and science inherently incompatable, or is there some tidy compromise which can pave the way for more research on war and peace issues? Fischhoff, Pidgeon, and Fiske (1983) point out that few people study nuclear war because it presents an interesting new way to explore human behavior. Most study it out of personal or collective self-interest. The result is a blurring of the traditional distinction between science and advocacy.

In a recent discussion of advocacy research Robinson (1984) points out that psychology exists not just for itself, but in the world of people and ultimately for the world of people. It can be argued that to see wrong and do nothing about it is to be complicitous. Indeed, history is full of examples of the social costs incurred when scholars and professionals remained silent. For psychology in particular, the nuclear era may force a new blunt honesty about the influence of politics, the constraints of methodology, and the risks of expertise (Morawski and Goldstein, 1985). These authors argue that psychology's traditional model of pursuing only objective knowledge free of political interest results in a constricted system of inquiry. It has been pointed out (Fiske, 1982) that scientists like to separate their research from their values, but in fact most research is a value judgment of what seems important to the investigator.

There are many important roles that psychologists can play as advocates in the effort to prevent nuclear war (Schofield and Pavelchak, 1985). By merely asking questions and reporting the answers, the present research can be viewed as a type of advocacy research discussed by Fischhoff, et. al. (1983). By providing an analysis of public opinion which competes with the standard polls, it suggests that well-informed people are more fearful of war and more anxious for arms control than governments realize. It also suggests that there may be much more uncertainty about what the public wants than what political leaders tell us. For researchers, it provides material which can and will be read by people outside of the field, which is not usually the case with scientific research. At the very least, it provides an interesting international perspective on how people in two very different communities view a common problem. Hopefully it might stimulate other international and intercultural research elsewhere. Perhaps such research is a reflection of a broader movement of the 1980s to rekindle the nuclear activism of the 1950s to end the nuclear apathy which has characterized scientists and citizens alike during much of the 1960s and 1970s (Boyer, 1984).

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	UNITED STATES		FINLAND	
	Survivalists	Activists	Survivalists	Activist
1. Frequency of discussing nuclear issues with family or friends				
frequently	25%	45%	18%	26%
on occasion	49%	51%	66%	56%
almost never	26%	4	16%	18%
2. Military spending in their own country				
too much	29%	88%	13%	29%
too little	23%	4%	37%	11%
about right	48%	8%	50%	60%
3. Survival				
would probably survive	27%	6%	39%	4%
might survive	74%	7%	61%	4%
would probably die	0	88%	0	92%
4. Possible to win a nuclear war?				
yes	18%	2%	14%	5%
no	54%	93%	76%	89%
don't know	29%	100%	36%	100%
5. Opposed arms race personally				
no	83%	0	64%	0
yes	18%	100	36%	100%
6. Vote for hawk candidates				
more likely to support	32%	3%	10%	5%
less likely to support	29%	86%	46%	65%
military spending doesn't affect my vote	39%	11%	44%	31%
7. Goal of U.S. military policy				
being number one	25%	8%		
parity with Soviets	15%	6%	not asked	
deterrence	42%	24%		
disarmament	19%	62%		
8. Nuclear buildup provides				
more security	53%	17%		
less security	23%	55%	not asked	
no effect	24%	28%		
9. Percent of survivalists and activists by sex (corrected for oversampling of females)				
male	65%	43%	68%	45%
female	35%	57%	32%	55%

Table 1. A comparison of Activists (those who said they have done something personally to oppose the arms race) and Survivalists (those who said they probably would survive (or might survive) a nuclear war.